With rapid development of information and communication technologies purchasing digital content through the Internet has been greatly increased. Therefore, secure and fair electronic payment systems are important issue. To reduce system computational, communication and storage costs in many existing electronic schemes, Yang et al. recently proposed a novel electronic payment system based on authenticated encryption technology. But, Chaudhry et al. showed that Yang et al.'s electronic payment system is vulnerable to impersonation attack. Furthermore, Chaudhry et al. proposed improved electronic payment system. But, in this paper we point that Chaudhry et al.'s improved electronic payment system does not satisfy anonymity and fairness properties and the dispute resolution means in Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system are not effective. Furthermore, combining authenticated encryption and verifiably encrypted signatures technologies, we propose an improvement on Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system. Compared with Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system, the major changes of the proposed electronic payment system are in exchange phase. In this phase the private key and public key of the user are not needed, and the user generates verifiably encrypted signatures on his payment voucher. These changes guarantee the user anonymity, eliminate the advantages of the merchant, ensure the fairness of the payment system and the effectiveness of the dispute resolution phase. We also give the comparisons of proposed electronic payment system with some existing electronic payment systems.
Introduction
In recent years, with rapid development of information and communication technologies purchasing digital content such as images, audio, and video through the Internet has been greatly increased. Therefore, secure electronic payment schemes as an integral part of any electronic commerce system are important for digital content transactions over the internet. After the first anonymous electronic payment scheme proposed by Chaum 1 many payment schemes were proposed. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] In a typical electronic payment scheme there are three participants: a user, a merchant, and a bank. Before one transaction, the user and the merchant must register with the bank, and open their account to benefit electronic payment. When the user wants to buy digital goods from the merchant, the user first gets a payment voucher (e-cash) from the bank. Then, he pays the payment voucher to the merchant. After verifying the validity of the payment voucher, the merchant sends the goods to the user, and sends the payment voucher to the bank, and the bank transfers money to the merchant's account. A secure welldesigned electronic payment system should ensure the user's anonymity, fair exchange, and dispute resolution. The anonymity ensures the user's identity and purchasing information are confidential to the merchant and the bank, respectively. Fair exchange provides the guarantee that none of the participant has unfair advantage. To resolve the dispute caused by some participant who does not execute some terms of the protocol, a trusted third party (TTP) is needed in the payment system.
Recently, to reduce system computational, communication and storage costs in many existing electronic payment schemes, for resource constrained environments Yang et al. 17 proposed a novel authenticated encryption scheme and an electronic payment system based on their authenticated encryption scheme. But, Chaudhry et al. 18 and Heydari et al. 19 cryptanalyzed Yang et al.'s authenticated encryption scheme and electronic payment system and showed both to be vulnerable to impersonation attack. An adversary just having the knowledge of public parameters can impersonate as a legitimate user. The attacker can easily exploit the weakness of Yang et al.'s electronic payment scheme and can fraudulently purchase digital contents by deceiving the bank and merchant. Furthermore, Chaudhry et al. 18 improved both Yang et al.'s authenticated encryption scheme and electronic payment system. Chaudhry et al. claimed that the improved electronic payment system ensures robustness against all known attacks, while reducing about 66% computation cost on user side as compared to Yang et al.'s electronic payment scheme, and the improved electronic payment system is more suitable for resource constrained environments. But, in this paper we point that Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system does not satisfy the basic anonymity and fairness properties, and the dispute resolution means in Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system are not effective.
To contribute an anonymous and fair electronic payment system for digital contents, this paper, combining authenticated encryption and verifiably encrypted signatures technologies, 20 proposes an improved electronic payment system. Furthermore, the comparisons of security and computation cost of proposed electronic payment system with some existing electronic payment systems are given.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Initialization phase
During this phase, system selects finite field F P over a large prime p ! 2 160 and an elliptic curve E P ða, bÞ. Further it selects a base point P in E P ða, bÞ and symmetric key algorithm E k ðÁÞ=D k ðÁÞ. Each legal participant with identity ID i chooses his private key d i and computes his public key Y i ¼ d i P. Finally system parameters and each participant's public key are published, while each participant keeps his private key secret.
Buying phase
This phase starts when a legal user U wants to purchase some electronic goods. Initially U downloads the goods information (GI) from the merchant M's website. Then U selects a random number r 2 Z p , and computes
Here T 1 is time stamp. Further U accumulates the goods price p ¼ P n i¼1 price i and generates payment text m ¼ HðGIjj pjjID b Þ. Finally U generates
and sends the tuple ðC 1 , R, T 1 Þ to the bank B.
Paying phase
Upon receiving the authenticated encrypted message tuple ðC 1 , R, T 1 Þ, the bank B, first computes
Further B checks the validity of time stamp T 1 and verifies whether k x is same as found after decryption of C 1 . B accepts the message if both T 1 and k x are valid. Otherwise rejects the message. Further B deducts the money amounting p from U's account and transfers p into a temporary account. B selects an expiry date E and computes M ¼ mjjE. Further B creates M's digital signature DS based on elliptic curve cryptography. Finally, B computes and sends C 2 ¼ E k x ðDSjjEjjk x jT 2 Þ to U and stores ðDS, MÞ in his database.
Exchange phase
The exchange phase consists of following three steps:
Step 1: After receiving encrypted message, U first decrypts C 2 to obtain DS and expiry date E. Then U selects r 0 2 Z p , and computes
Step 2: Upon receiving Step 3: U decrypts C 4 to acquire electronic goods.
Transferring phase
M sends the payment proof to B before expiry date. U is having the facility to ask B to terminate the transaction if he did not receive the goods, in that case B transfers back the money from temporary account to U's account. After expiry date B transfers the money to M's account and removes fDS, Mg from his database.
Dispute resolution phase
If user does not get the desired product or merchant do not get the correct payment voucher then they can initiate dispute resolution phase. A TTP is responsible for resolving the dispute, in either cases TTP will be given the merchant's private key to verify the correctness of key k 0 x . TTP after getting message ðC 3 , R 0 , T 3 Þ can verify legality of customer by computing following
TTP compares T 3 received in plain text and got after decryption. Similarly TTP compares k 0 x computed in first equation given above and decrypted in second equation given above, if both are equal the customer and merchant both are legal. TTP can further verify the encrypted digital signature DS and product's information. Hence TTP can resolve the dispute among both customer and merchant.
Shortcomings of Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system
In this section, we discuss how Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system is subjected to the following three attacks.
The system cannot ensure user anonymity
In the exchange phase of Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system, in step 2 when the merchant M com-
Then the identity of the user must be exposed to the merchant. Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system does not satisfy the important anonymity property for electronic payment system.
The system does not satisfy the fairness property
The fairness property is an important property for digital content electronic payment system. In exchange phase of Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system, once the user sends ðC 3 , R 0 , T 3 Þ to the merchant, the merchant can get the payment voucher from decrypting C 3 without sending electronic goods to the user. So, Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system is advantageous to the merchant, the user faces the risk of paying payment voucher to the merchant, but not getting the goods.
In the dispute resolution phase, TTP cannot effectively resolve the dispute among both customer and merchant
In the dispute resolution phase of Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system, the authors claimed that if the user does not get the desired product or the merchant does not get the correct payment voucher then they can beg TTP to resolve the dispute. Firstly, to resolve the dispute, TTP must get the merchant's private key. It is an obvious regrettable thing to expose private key for the merchant. Secondly, after obtaining the merchant's private key TTP must do lots of computation to verify if the customer and merchant are legal. Then TTP verifies the validity of the payment poof generated by the bank. This is clearly not an ideal dispute resolution means.
The proposed scheme
In this section, combining authenticated encryption and verifiably encrypted signatures technologies, we will improve Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system and propose a fair electronic payment system for digital content. In the proposed system, there are four participants: a user, a merchant, a bank, and a TTP. The proposed scheme consists of six phases: initialization phase, buying phase, paying phase, exchange phase, transferring phases, and dispute resolution phase. When the user wants to buy digital content from the merchant, he first asks a payment voucher from the bank. Then, the user generates a verifiably encrypted signature of the payment voucher and sends the verifiably encrypted signature to the merchant. After verifying the validity of the verifiably encrypted signature, the merchant sends the digital content to the user. After receiving the digital content, the user sends the payment voucher to the merchant. Before expiry date the merchant sends the payment voucher to the bank, and the bank transfers the money to the merchant's account. If there is a dispute between the user and the merchant in one transaction, they can initiate dispute resolution phase to ask TTP to resolve the dispute.
Compared with Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system, the major changes of the proposed electronic payment system are in exchange phase. In step 1 the private key of the user is not needed. So, in step 2 the public key of the user is not needed for the merchant's computation. Also in step 1 the user generates the verifiably encrypted signature on the payment voucher, and sends the verifiably encrypted signature instead of payment voucher itself to the merchant. These changes guarantee the user anonymity, eliminate the advantages of the merchant, ensure the effectiveness of the dispute resolution phase, and the fairness of the payment system.
Following is the detailed description of the proposed system.
Initialization phase
During this phase, system selects finite field F P over a large prime p ! 2 160 and an elliptic curve E P ða, bÞ. Further it selects a base point P in E P ða, bÞ and symmetric key algorithm E k ðÁÞ=D k ðÁÞ, each participant with identity ID i chooses his private key d i , and computes his public key Y i ¼ d i P. Finally system parameters and each participant's public key are published, while each participant keeps his private key secret. The user and the merchant must register with the bank, and open their account to benefit electronic payment.
Buying phase
This phase starts when a legal user U wants to purchase some electronic goods. Initially U downloads GI from merchant M's website. Then U selects a random number r 2 Z q , and computes 
Paying phase
Upon receiving the authenticated encrypted message tuple ðID u , C 1 , R, T 1 Þ, the bank B, first computes
Further B checks the validity of time stamp T 1 and verifies whether k x is same as found after decryption of C 1 . B accepts the message if both T 1 and k x are valid. Otherwise rejects the message. Further B deducts the money amounting p from U's account and transfers p into a temporary account. B selects an expiry date E and computes M ¼ mjjE. Further B creates M's digital signature DS based on elliptic curve cryptography. Finally, B computes and sends C 2 ¼ E k x ðDSjjEjjk x jT 2 Þ to U and stores ðDS, MÞ in his database. Here T 2 is time stamp.
Exchange phase
The exchange phase consists of following four steps:
Step 1: U after receiving encrypted message, first decrypts C 2 to obtain DS and expiry date E. Then U selects r 0 , z 2 Z q , and computes
is a verifiably encrypted signature generated by using random number z, TTP's public key and the payment voucher DS, T 3 is time stamp. Finally U sends ðC 3 , Z, R 0 , T 3 Þ to M. 
Step 3: U decrypts C 4 to acquire electronic goods, and sends C 5 ¼ E k 0 x ðDSÞ to M.
Step 4: M decrypts C 5 to acquire the payment voucher DS and verify it.
Transferring phase M sends the payment voucher DS to B before expiry date. If B can find fDS, Mg in his database B transfers the money in the temporary account to M's account and removes fDS, Mg from his database.
Dispute resolution phase
If the merchant does not get the correct payment voucher DS after he sends the electronic goods to the user, the merchant can initiate dispute resolution phase. Security analysis of the proposed electronic payment system As Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system, the proposed electronic payment system ensures mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, resists replay attack, and double spending attack.
In the proposed electronic payment system all important messages transmitted include time stamps which in encrypted part cannot be altered by any adversary. So, the proposed electronic payment system can resist replay attack. In the proposed electronic payment system the user U sends GI protected by one hash function to the bank, and the digital signature DS does not reveal the user's information. Therefore, the proposed system protects the user's buying privacy. Once the payment is transferred to merchant's account, the bank deletes the signature DS. So, DS can be used only once, the proposed electronic payment system prevents double spending of same payment voucher.
In this section, to aim at the shortcomings of Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system, we deal mainly with the anonymity and fairness of the proposed electronic payment system.
Anonymity
In the exchange phase, the user can securely communicate with the merchant by selecting a random number r 0 and generating share key r 0 Y m without using his private key and no user's identity and public key be known by the merchant. So, the user's identity is anonymous to the merchant. Since the bank only keeps ðDS, MÞ in his database, DS and M are irrelevant to the user's identity. So, in transferring phase, the bank cannot trace the user who drew DS from the bank. Therefore, the user's identity is also anonymous to the bank in transferring phase.
Fairness issue
In the step 1 of the exchange phase, the user does not send the payment voucher DS to the merchant, the merchant only get the verifiably encrypted signature DS 0 on DS. In the step 2, when the merchant verifies that DS 0 is valid, the merchant sends Electronic goods to the user. If the user does not execute the step 3, the merchant can get the payment voucher DS in dispute resolution phase. If in step 1 after getting DS 0 the merchant does not executes the step 2, the user also can ask TTP to check whether there is a record ðDS, Electronic goodsÞ in TTP's database. If there is no record ðDS, Electronic goodsÞ, it indicates that the merchant does not get DS. The user also cannot get Electronic goods. If there is the record ðDS, Electronic goodsÞ, it indicates that the merchant gets DS by TTP. So, TTP can give Electronic goods to the user. Therefore, the electronic payment system is fair to both the user and the merchant.
Comparisons
In this section the comparisons of the proposed electronic payment system with some existing electronic payment systems [17] [18] [19] are given. The security comparison is shown in Table 1 , and the comparison of computation cost in major three phases of each electronic payment system is shown in Table 2 . In the security comparison, the proposed system is more secure than the three electronic payment systems. [17] [18] [19] In comparison of computation cost with Yang et al. 17 in exchanging phase, there are more one signature operation, one encryption operation, and one decryption operation in the proposed electronic payment system. Compared with Chaudhry et al. 18 and Heydari et al., 19 in exchanging phase there are more two scalar multiplication operation, one signature operation, one encryption operation, one decryption operation and few two multiplication operation and one inverse operation in the proposed electronic payment system. The computation cost of the proposed electronic payment system is slightly higher. But, the proposed electronic payment system is more secure.
Conclusion
In this paper we point that Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system does not satisfy the anonymity and fairness properties and the dispute resolution means in Chaudhry et al.'s electronic payment system are not effective. Furthermore, based on verifiably encrypted signatures technique, this paper proposes an improved electronic payment system and compares the security and computation cost of the proposed electronic payment system with some existing electronic payment systems. The proposed system is more secure and suitable for resource constrained environments.
